Normalization Of Deviance




It's not Rocket Science
Written by James O. Westgard, PhD, and Sten Westgard  

http://www.westgard.com/guest25.htm

An updated version of this essay appears in the Nothing but the Truth book.

The loss of the Columbia and Challenger Shuttles were not just technical failures - they were also a result of a culture at NASA that devalued safety. As we look at the Shuttle failures, how can we be sure that labs aren't doing the same thing?

Lessons from the Columbia and Challenger Disasters

In a time of crisis and war, the disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1st, 2003, was yet another tragedy in a series of misfortunes that plagued the US. But even this horrible event was quickly overshadowed by the war in Iraq and the subsequent bloody occupation. Since that time, analysis of how and why the Shuttle failed has been lost in the shuffle, drowned about by stories of war, politics, budget shortfalls, and the usual celebrity nonsense that dominates the news. As a result the names of Rick D. Husband, William C. McCool, Michael P. Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Blair Salton Clark, Ilan Romon are not likely to enter the public consciousness.

The Columbia disaster not took the lives of seven individuals who had dedicated their lives to the space program and science, it may have brought an end to the aggressive US pursuit of manned space flight. In light of the problems revealed in NASA and the resources needed to fix it, the entire NASA program may wither on the vine due to lack of funds and political will.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board released its report on August 26th, 2003, This report is a document of extraordinary analysis and introspection. The investigatory board refused to confine their report to a single, simple failure. Instead, they conducted a thorough analysis of not only the technical flaws, but the organizational flaws that allowed the technical errors to occur. As it turns out, the management culture at NASA was as much to blame for the Shuttle loss as the actual foam strike that occurred 81.7 seconds after liftoff. Reading through the report, you can find disturbing similarities in the culture of NASA to the prevailing culture found in the healthcare industry.

“Many accident investigations make the same mistake in defining causes. They identify the widget that broke or malfunctioned, then locate the person most closely connected with the technical failure: the engineer who miscalculated an analysis, the operator who missed signals or pulled the wrong switches, the supervisor who failed to listen, or the manager who made bad decisions. When causal chains are limited to technical flaws and individual failures, the ensuing responses aimed at preventing a similar event in the future are equally limited: they aim to fix the technical problem and replace or retrain the individual responsible. Such corrections lead to a misguided and potentially disastrous belief that the underlying problem has been solved.” [1]

“It's not rocket science”, used to be a common phrase in our vernacular, as a way to note the amazing accomplishments of our space program -- while decrying the problems here on earth that have simpler solutions and yet are still unsolved. Now, unfortunately, it seems that even our rocket scientists aren't what they used to be. But now when we claim that our industry isn't rocket science, we may be trying to distance ourselves from their failures.

But there are hard lessons to be learned in the Columbia disaster, not only for NASA, but for any industry. We in healthcare would do well to study the reasons for this failure and the implications for patient safety. We ignore it at our peril and the peril of the patients we serve.

The simple cause

On February 1st, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated in mid-air while attempting to land. The Columbia Accident Investigation Report, released on August 27th of the same year, detailed the specific causes of the accident:

"The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to survive."[2]

Seventeen years earlier, the space Shuttle Challenger blew up during launch due to the failure of O-ring seals on the joints of the booster rockets.

From a simple technical perspective, the foam strike and the O-ring failure share few features. However, the context of the failures share much in common. Most strikingly, NASA was aware of both of these flaws well before the fatal flights of Challenger and Columbia. Before the Challenger explosion, there had been nine previous O-ring failures. Before the Columbia disaster, there had been at least seven previous foam strikes. [3] Yet despite knowledge of these flaws, in both cases, management continued to let the Shuttles fly. In fact, even after concern was raised about the foam strike on the last flight of the Columbia, management continued to believe that there was no threat to the safety of the mission.

Budgetary and Schedule Pressures

From 1992 to 2000, “Smaller, Faster, Cheaper” was the mantra espoused by NASA and its head administrator, Dan Goldin. While politicians hailed the success of the space program, they cut its budget by 40%[4] . Without a clear mandate, NASA had to rob from the Shuttle program to fund other projects like the International Space Station, even as the station required more Shuttle flights to build the station.

Under funding pressure, NASA began out-sourcing much of its work to contractors, and simultaneously began to cut its safety program. It was assumed that safety could be reduced because the contractors would assume the responsibility for safety. Multiple job titles in the safety program were assigned to the same person. The remaining safety program employees found their salaries dependent upon the very programs they were supposed to oversee, leading to inevitable conflict of interest.

In public, NASA officials declared over and over again the importance of safety. However, the board found that “personnel cutbacks sent other signals. Streamlining and downsizing, which scarcely go unnoticed by employees, convey a message that efficiency is an important goal….When paired with the ‘faster, better, cheaper‘ NASA motto of the 1990s and cuts that dramatically decreased safety personnel, efficiency becomes a strong signal and safety a weak one.” [5]

Sally Ride, former astronaut and the first woman in space, participated in the Challenger and Columbia Accident investigations. About the budget pressures at NASA, she had this so say: “’Faster, better, cheaper’ when applied to the human space program, was not a productive concept. It was a false economy. Its very difficult to have all three simultaneously. Pick your favorite two. With human space flight, you’d better add the word ‘safety’ in there, too…” [6]

Because of funding problems and the political pressure associated with funding, NASA had to continually demonstrate that it was delivering value for the investment. Launches became a concrete way of showing Congress that the billions spent on the space program were worthwhile. “NASA was transformed from a research and development agency to more of a business, with schedules, production pressures, deadlines, and cost efficiency goals elevated to the level of technical innovation and safety goals.“ [7]

The top levels of NASA soon began to be occupied by business managers instead of technical engineers. The Shuttle had once been termed a “developmental” vehicle, which meant that it could fly but that it wasn’t quite ready for prime time. Under the new management culture, the Shuttle became an “operational” vehicle, which meant the goal was to squeeze out as much operation (i.e. launches) as possible. As a result, small flaws like o-ring erosion and foam hits were not seen as serious dangers to the Shuttle flight and were tolerated as part of routine operations. Since these things weren’t “serious“ flaws, and fixing them would delay flights, the Shuttle would fly with them. “Scarce resources went to problems that were defined as more serious, rather than to foam strikes or O-ring erosion” [8] Management fully intended to fix the minor flaws eventually, but only after the launch schedules were met.

Again, Sally Ride provides insight: “….if upper management is going ‘faster, better, cheaper,’ that percolates down, and it puts the emphasis on meeting schedules and improving the way that you do things and on cost. And over the years, it provides the impression that budget and schedule are the most important things.” [9]

It’s not rocket Science…

  • Has healthcare entered an era where efficiency and cost are valued more than quality?
  • Has management traded technical expertise for business training, rather than adding business training to technical training, in an effort to improve efficiency and cost?
  • As laboratories outsource method validation responsibilities and other tasks, do we assume that our vendors are providing us with the quality we need? If our vendors don’t, do we maintain the skills to tell the difference and perform the necessary services ourselves?
  • Is the approach for “Doing more with Less” in the laboratory any different from the “faster, cheaper, better” mantra? Do the physicians want tests faster or better? Does the healthcare organization want the laboratory to operate cheaper or better?
  • Do we know how the cost savings from "faster and cheaper" compare to the cost of rework due to poor quality test results?
  • Have medical laboratory scientists been replaced by less skilled technical personnel? Do the upper levels of management understand the quality control issues in the lab, or just know enough to speak the words?

The Normalization of Deviance

Both the Challenger and Columbia accident investigation boards asked similar questions: Why did NASA continue to fly the Shuttle with known foam debris problems that dated back years before the fatal Columbia launch? And why did NASA continue to fly the Shuttle with known O-ring erosion problems that dated back years before the Challenger launch?

The answer is that these errors had been “normalized” over many occurrences until managers and even the engineers themselves began to believe that these flaws were routine and acceptable. Diane Vaughan, in her exhaustive book, The Challenger Launch Decision (University of Chicago Press, 1996 ), coined a telling phrase for this behavior: the “Normalization of Deviance.”

When the Shuttle was originally designed, no allowance was made for the possibility that foam debris could fall off the main tank and strike the wing. Nor was any allowance made for the possibility that in cold temperatures, the O-rings on the booster rockets would shrink and erode. When these events were first experienced, the design principles were therefore violated, “but in both cases after the first incident the engineering analysis concluded that the design could tolerate the damage. These engineers decided to implement a temporary fix and/or accept the risk, and fly. For both O-rings and foam, that first decision was a turning point. It established a precedent for accepting, rather than eliminating, these technical deviations.” [10]

As further foam strikes occurred, engineers now accepted those problems as expected behavior of the Shuttle. The fact that the Shuttle kept flying was seen as further evidence that these errors were acceptable. If a foam strike occurred during a flight, that just proved it wasn’t a serious danger, since it didn’t bring down the Shuttle. So the errors were no longer even seen as errors. They had become “normalized” - a foam strike was now considered a normal part of a Shuttle lift-off. Over time, larger and larger foam strikes were tolerated, since previous strikes hadn’t caused a problem. So when the fatal piece of foam struck the left wing of the Colombia, it was dismissed as a minor issue that would be repaired once the Shuttle landed, despite the fact that it was one of the largest pieces yet to strike a Shuttle.

In effect, the normalization of deviance broke the safety culture at NASA. They fell down the slippery slope, tolerating more and more errors, accepting more and more risk. If everything was tolerable, how did one object? Management began to demand proof that errors would bring down a Shuttle, instead of making the proper reverse demand: show proof that the Shuttle has NOT been harmed. Without the resources to test and prove that the Shuttle had indeed been harmed by the last foam strike, the remaining safety engineers at NASA were effectively silenced.

During the Challenger investigation, Richard Feynman, the Nobel laureate, famously compared the launching of a Shuttle with a game of Russian Roullette. While that overstated the case, it was not far off the mark. Managers at NASA deliberately took a risk. They believed the risk was quite low or zero, but they had not even done the calculations to know how big the risk was. They pushed and pushed the limits without understanding what or where the limits really were. By relentlessly pushing the envelope, tragedy was almost inevitable.

It’s not rocket science…

  • Are we tolerating more errors in the laboratory because we know test results can’t be perfect?
  • Has repeating the controls become the common response to any out-of-control event?
  • Are control limits being artificially “widened” by use of bottle values or peer-group SDs?
  • Have we entered an era where analytical errors are no longer considered important? Has the emphasis on pre-analytical and post-analytical errors made us assume that we no longer have to worry about analytical errors?
  • Does the ISO move to change error terminology to “uncertainty” obscure the concern and importance of laboratory errors?
  • Isn't it easier to accept being "uncertain" than being in error?

Lessons for the Laboratory: Is there a Columbia/Challenger in our future?

“It is our view that complex systems almost always fail in complex ways, and we believe it would be wrong to reduce the complexities and weaknesses to some simple explanation. Too often, accident investigations blame a failure only on the last step in a complex process, when a more comprehensive understanding of that process could reveal that earlier steps might be equally or even more culpable. In this board’s opinion, unless the technical, organizational and cultural recommendations made in this report are implemented, little will have been accomplished to lessen the chance that another accident will follow.” [11]

We in healthcare can pretend that what happened at NASA can't possibly happen to us. But the healthcare industry shares one core characteristic with NASA: safety. Although it often goes unstated or unsaid, the primary concern with both healthcare and manned space flight is safety. The very root of medicine, as codified in the ancient Hippocratic Oath, is to Do No Harm. Likewise, when President Kennedy set the supreme goal for NASA, it wasn't just to send a man to the moon, it was to send a man to the moon and return him home safely.

This core concern for safety makes both NASA and healthcare unique among industries. Budgets and deadlines dominate every business, inescapably so, but the failure of most businesses is financial, not fatal. As we have forced the space program and healthcare into the usual business model, we squeezed out safety. Other businesses can “push the envelope” and fail without serious consequence - a product or service doesn't sell, they go out of business, employees and sometimes CEOs lose their jobs. Pushing the envelope in our field can maim or kill people.

The fact still remains that laboratory medicine is not “rocket science,” but the technical sophistication and complexity of the instrumentation and testing processes are ever-increasing. And mounting pressure has been applied to laboratory medicine to produce cheaper and faster results in the guise of satisfying physician demands and patient needs. Shouldn’t correct results be a higher priority?

Reading through the Accident Report, there are startling echoes of the cultural failures at NASA and the current trends and attitudes in healthcare. Surely the stakes for healthcare are just as high as for NASA. The Space Shuttle puts dozens of people into space in a year, while millions of people go through the healthcare system every day. As the IOM report warned, somewhere between 40,000 and 98,000 deaths can be attributed to the failures of the healthcare system.

The Space Shuttle, as of 2003, had flown 112 missions. Two of those missions ended catastrophically. A gross calculation based on just those two numbers reveals a 1.7% error rate, or a Six Sigma metric of 3.7. We in the laboratory already know that some of our processes have Sigma metrics well below 3.7. That fact alone should give us pause.

In healthcare, our failures are not so spectacular as Shuttle explosions, but they are much more prevalent and frequent. These failures occur over time, in circumstances that obscure and insulate the possible root causes of the failures, that distribute over large patient populations, and spread out the responsibilities across multiple healthcare professions. But undeniably, our failures impact and affect many, many people. We would do well to learn from the failures of our rocket scientists and make sure that our own practices don’t repeat those mistakes.

References

  1. Columbia Accident Investigation Board (hereafter CAIB) Report, Volume I, August 2003, p.177. Available online at http://caib.nasa.gov
  2. CAIB Report, Executive Summary.
  3. General Donald Kutyna, quoted in New York Times New Analysis, 8/27/03, p.16.
  4. News Analysis, David E. Sanger, New York Times, 8/27/03, page 1.
  5. CAIB report, p.199.
  6. Interview, New York Times, 8/26/03, p.F2.
  7. Howard E. McCurdy, “The Decay of NASA’s Technical Culture” Space Policy, November 1989, pp.301-10, referenced on page 198 of theCAIB Report.
  8. CAIB report, p.200.
  9. Interview, New York Times, 8/26/03, p.F2.
  10. CAIB report, p.196.
  11. Ibid,, Board Statement.

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Normalization of Deviance: A Formula for Predictable Surprise

 

Attending PMIWDC, I met former Astronaut and inductee into the International Hall of Fame, Colonel Mike Mullane. He is an author of “Riding Rockets“, and “Do your Ears Pop in Space“.

Col. Mullane conveyed that the responsibility and duty all project team members must have to contribute to project success, regardless of their position. He discussed that Astronauts share credit for their success with their team, and despite being the most visible part of the mission, the NASA team extends to the people that man mission control, to the engineers that build the spacecraft, to the specialists that develop and configure human life support systems, to the nutritionists that prepare the meals for the voyage, to the janitors who sweep the floors.  He describes that when it comes to preventing mission risk transforming into issues, the perception of ALL team members must be considered.  This philosopy is fully amplified and fictionally illustrated by the “West Wing” character, Toby Ziegler, who when hearing that the shuttle mission on which his brother was a specialist had problems with the shuttle bay doors remarked, “Mr. President, thank you for your concern, however in space, there is no such thing as a small problem.”

To counter these effects, he described that his first act working with any member of a team is to assure that they understand what Normalization of Deviance, in addition to the consequences that  occur.  Normalization of Deviance was the primary contributing factor to creating both Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters.  The technical reasons for both disasters are well documented and too lengthy to discuss here.  Mike Mullane’s reasoning for why both shuttles experienced catastrophic failure, coincides with my own understanding of why projects fail.  We seldom fail from the technical, we most always overlook management over the implementation.  For the most part this is because the technology is sexy, and we lead ourselves to believe the fallacy that technology works automatically, that it has been tested to work, and should be trusted to always work without failure.This is certainly the case of the “unsinkable” HMS Titanic.

Within a PMI project management approach, one of the core activities to performing Risk Management is Risk Identification. I have been in organizations where Risk Identification was generally overlooked as a point of normalized deviance.  The process requires that we perform a risk assessement, so we do. “We don’t have the time to get our technical staff involved, they will only slow us down to fill out our risk register.” How many times have you seen that?  Why do a risk assessment this way?  “We have to be prepared for the audit.” Who does the audit? Corporate Quality Assurance, who observes that indeed the risk register is up to date, and identified risks are being entered and monitored, and they checkmark the box.  This is a failure waiting to happen from habitual deviance from core principals of the established standard, which enables an organization to place their full trust behind the process in place, with complete disregard to its consequence.  Mike Mullane describes that the only result that comes from this practice is “Predictable Surprise”.

Col Mullane defines Normalization of Deviance as the working or mission environment created when established standards are subverted incrementally over time without consequence, by routinely rewarding shortcuts from the established norm.  As team members continue this practice (normalization), it leads to “predictable surprise”, incursion of risk, technical failure, and in the worst cases complete and catastrophic failure and loss of property and life. To demonstrate his point, Col. Mullane provided the detailed insight of an astronaut and engineer to explain the failures that caused the Challenger disaster, citing specifically that NASA knew that the O-rings had a specific temperature tolerance, and that recovered solid booster rockets were being recovered with burnt interior O-ring walls, something that should never happen. He also described how after recovery of the cockpit, it was discovered that all the panels had their switches in emergency position, meaning that the crew was still alive immediately following the explosion.  He also described that the space shuttle was the first NASA vehicle to not have an emergency egress, unlike former “rocket” style vehicles that had all had emergency capsule escape towers that would pull the capsule off the top of the rocket at nine G’s away from the catastrophic failure of the rest of the rocket.  With the shuttle, this could not happen as it was not part of the shuttle design as any attempt to escape would cause the astronaut to get hit by the shuttle wing.

NASA Engineers began seeking a new way to egress, using rockets.  NASA Engineers tested the “Emergency Egress Fixed Rocket Package” which pulls an astronaut from the shuttle by connecting a rocket, to a lanyard, to a parachute harness to the astronaut.  This apparatus was designed to fire astronaut horizontally from the shuttle door.  Engineers used rockets for this design because rockets HAD ALWAYS been used. It was a maddening and dangerous design.  It took a flight surgeon, not an engineer, playing his role as part of the bigger team to suggest a telescoping firepole, a design that they use on the shuttle today.

This stressed to me the importance of maintaining one’s team presence.  Col. Mullane distinguished the difference between team members who are team players, and those who have chosen to be passengers. He amplified this point by by describing one of his early flights over Vietnam where as a REO (TopGun “Goose” position) and he chose to remaining silent when his pilot called Bingo Fuel (point of safe return to base) and desired to continue to the next objective. Even as a rookie pilot, Col. Mullane knew this was a really bad idea, however he let his pilot’s longevity and experience influence his judgment, and by remaining silent, he chose to be a passenger and not a functioning member of the team. The consequence of this decision was a short landing where the pilot and REO ejected, and the plane crashed in pieces on the runway.

Col. Mullane helped me understand the relation between process and risk, to better understand the projects I manage, and reduce the potential for predictable surprise.  He an excellent keynote speaker with a terrific mastery of his topic. Col. Mullane’s highly inspiring and educational presentation was worthy of the standing ovation that he received from PMI. He is clearly an accomplished deutrolearner (student and teacher within the same body), and explains the traits necessary to use these talents within ourselves to reach the stars.  Within his presentation, he mixed autobiographical elements that demonstrated how we all have the capability to strive for the stars and how destiny was not the primary driver toward him becoming an astronaut. On this point he offered many self-deprecating examples from his high school yearbook where he showed what destiny had to work with. My favorite: the only autograph on the last page read, “You missed Korea, I hope you make Vietnam!”

Web Site of Col. Mike Mullane: http://www.mikemullane.com/


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Click here to download:
Normalization of Deviance Slide Presentation.pdf (2.09 MB)
(download)

Columbia_fall

Italian Sausage & Clam Soup

Italian Sausage & Clam Soup

A great soup, made with spicy Italian sausage, clams, mushrooms, herbs and spices all in a tomato base.

1/3 cup olive oil
6 oz. Bulk spicy Italian sausage
1 medium onion
2 – 5 oz. Cans chopped clams
½ lb. Mushrooms sliced
3 cups tomato sauce
1 – 1/3 cup clam juice
1 tsp. Basil
2 tsp. Minced garlic
1 tbsp. Minced fresh parsley

Saute sausage, onions, and garlic in oil, drain.
Add remaining ingredients except clams and simmer for 30 minutes.
Add clams and heat thoroughly.
Serve and enjoy!

Makes 8 servings.

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What are we working for, really?

 



What are we working for, really?

What are we working for, really?

I told the farmer I wanted a horse.

Here are things I know about horses from the farmer’s response:

1. Horses are very cheap right now. It used to be that you could buy an estate, put horses on it, call it a horse farm, and take a tax deduction on all the land. But the US just banned slaughtering horses. I am not sure why. I think this is part of Obama’s attack on US subsidies to the rich. (Which, by the way, I support, and I am hoping he is so creative as this.) Anyway, now there are tons of people who want to get rid of horses.

2. Horses are a luxury to people who make a living from their farm. I will not get into the nuances of making a living vs. not making a living from a farm.

But wait. I think I will.

It’s complicated. For example, if your great-great-grandfather homesteaded land and consequently you inherited 2000 acres and you mortgage it to support your family, is the farm supporting you? And if you don’t mortgage it, but you live in poverty, is the farm supporting you? Stay tuned for posts when I answer these questions. Or just bitch about them. But anyway, horses are a luxury, according to the farmer, because they are a lot of work and they never make any money. (Well, except for the Amish, who still use horses to run farm equipment. But this will be in another post, too.)

No. I think it will be in this post. Everything in this post, but in a minute.

The issue is: what is making a living? And I actually do think I know the answer. The answer is if you are honestly making enough money to meet your needs.

So, for example, take Melville. He’s hard for me to read because he was such a crappy provider for his wife and kids. I try to not think of that because my favorite character in all of literature is Ahab. And maybe it’s impossible to write that crazy a character who we will still all identify with unless the author is crazy himself. Because we all would like to do just what we love and not support ourselves, but most of us don’t indulge ourselves that way.

I used to say that all anyone needed to earn was $40,000 a year. And, because I dedicated the last decade (perhaps inadvertently) to personally testing all the happiness research I read I can attest that when I made $300,000 a year in LA my happiness was the same as when I made $40,000 in NYC. And, in that time, the Big Happiness Number has become $75,000, but I think that how much money I made didn’t matter because my basic, underlying personal problems did not change.

Not that I am sure what they are, by the way. I am pretty certain, though, they are something about feeling lonely, because I don’t read non-verbal cues well, and because I didn’t feel loved as a kid. But, here’s something else I learned from the happiness research: You will gain more from being my friend if I talk about happiness than if I talk about sadness.

So, lucky for you, I am clearing the $75,000 mark nicely this year, and the farmer responded to my request for a horse. With a donkey. He said that I have to take care of the donkey each day and if I do that, then we can consider the horse. But the farmer doesn’t want to have a horse that he is taking care of.

The farmer thinks that taking care of animals that we don’t provide financial gain in return is a petting zoo, not a working farm. This is probably true. And, speaking of petting zoo, we have about 15 baby cats.

Here is a cat story: I think all farms have some cats. Is that right? Cat science: Tomcats travel from farm to farm, and girl cats stay on one farm. Some farms are very organized and they spay two cats and shoot the rest. Other farms, like the farmer’s farm, let nature take its course. When the farmer lived alone, it was so hard for the babies to stay alive that it was a sort of Malthusian society where, by the end of the winter, he was always down to a manageable population of five or six.

But then the kids and I moved in, and we started taking kittens to the vet. And then we started buying expensive, grocery store food for the cats instead of forcing them to fight for table scraps.

The kittens started thriving, and things were going so well for the mom cats, that they were even getting pregnant twice in one summer. This was great news to me and the kids, because seeing one-day old cats is amazing—they fit in your hand. And taking care of them is great fun. But the farmer got worried.

Side story to the cat story but essential information: One of the farmer’s friends, a dairy farmer, has a bunch of little girls, the demographic most likely to coddle kittens. After about three years of four girls, the friend’s farm had 150 cats. So the friend and his wife took their kids away for the day and he had three friends come with beer and shotguns and they turned the farm into a cat-killing video game. The cats with the red ribbons on their necks were the ones the family wanted to keep.

So I guess we will have one summer of kitten glory and then I’ll pay to spay the cats.

Which brings me to making a living on the farm. It’s always a debate. Is it making a living if you don’t have money to treat cats humanely? Because most farmers won’t spend the money to spay cats. Is it making a living if the wife works off-farm? Because most farm families today need someone working off-farm, at least for the health insurance.

Sometimes, when I’m philosophizing about what making a living means, I think about lifestyle. Which brings me to the Amish. We live in a community where the Amish are buying a lot of land. They sell their land in Pennsylvania for $20,000 an acre and then move to our region of Wisconsin and buy land for $5000 an acre. So I’m living amongst the yuppie Amish.

photo credit: 42N

To the Amish, making a living is sustaining a family within a community, and there’s a great new book that describes why this formula leads to success in business: Success Made Simple: An Inside Look at Why Amish Businesses Thrive, by Erik Wesner.  For the Amish, the community is first. They do not drive cars because driving does not promote community, but they can hire someone to drive them, because sometimes you need to do that, and anyway, the alternative of making everyone into crazy Luddites does not develop community either.

The Amish are making me rethink why people work. And what supporting a family means. The Amish sense of community is incredible, and while we each think we are making a living by supporting the family unit, or supporting ourselves to create a world full of meaningful relationships, we are nothing like the Amish. We make so many choices based on our individual desires. For example, that I want a horse, or that the farmer wants to never leave the farm for a job that pays $75,000 a year.

I am thinking that the research about what makes us happy always comes down to community, not money. You become more like your friends, meeting regularly with a group makes us happier, if we structure our lives around consistent relationshipsincluding proximity—we are happier. So maybe Wener’s book on business is the most useful research about happiness, because how to be happy is about how to make a living in a way that enables you to provide something for a group rather than just for yourself.



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http://www.jamescorbettart.com/

James, from Ningi, Queensland, Australia has been sculpting his incredibly life like pieces since early 1999, and since that time his unique works have found homes in all capital cities in Australia, also England, Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.A.

James discovered his talent for creating his amazing pieces of art whilst running an auto recycling business in Brisbane . His first piece was an off road race buggy, inspired by a sport James had participated in for some ten years. The response from friends and customers was so positive that he was encouraged to create more pieces; cars, bikes animals and birds, all of which sold readily. James likes to incorporate old and interesting car parts into his sculptures. Nothing is bent into shape; the original integrity of each car part is maintained. “The parts themselves are often interesting, some are as much as eighty years old”, says James.

Whether the purpose of the sculpture is for a private collection, public art, or simply a “must have”, James Corbett’s sculptures are undoubtedly some of the finest examples of assemblage art that you would be likely to encounter anywhere in the world.

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